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not technically in custody, he is faced with a representative of the gov-
ernment who possesses an awesome array of coercive powers.43
An adversary process is begun when a special agent has entered an
investigation, and it is submitted that it is logically irrelevant to
distinguish the situation in terms of having a crime and seeking an
offender, as opposed to having a suspect and trying to ascertain if a
crime has been committed. In either instance, the investigation is con-
ducted with an ultimate view to criminal prosecution and conviction.
It is at this point, in keeping with the fundamental concepts of con-
stitutional safeguards, that the taxpayer should be fully apprised of his
fifth and sixth amendment rights. Custody provides a concrete point at
which it can be said that the adversary process has begun, however,
this not the only situation in which the investigative machinery of
government is directed at a particular individual.*
Gerard M. Bigley
CONTRACTS-REERVATION OF POWER TO TERMINATE EXISTING CONTRACT
-The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that a clause requiring
written notice of termination within sixty days is satisfied by notice re-
ceived two days beyond termination date.
Music, Inc. v. Henry B. Klein Co., 213 Pa. Super. 182, 245 A.2d 650
(1968).
Plaintiff contracted to provide defendant Klein programmed music ser-
vice. The contract as quoted by the court provided:
The term of this agreement shall be for three (3) years and eight
(8) months from the date of installation and shall continue there-
43. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7602. (Statutory right to inspect books and
records, etc.).
* During the writing of this casenote the IRS changed policy regarding constitutional
warnings at the initial stages of a tax investigation. Now at an initial meeting with a
taxpayer, an IRS special agent is required to identify himself, describe his function, and
advise the taxpayer that anything he says may be used against him. The agent must also
tell the taxpayer that he cannot be compelled to incriminate himself by answering any
questions or producing any documents, and that he has the right to seek the assistance
of an attorney before responding.
Previously, the special agent identified himself and described his function at the first
meeting with a taxpayer, but was not required to give further advice unless the taxpayer
was in custody or the investigation proceeded beyond the preliminary stage. See Standard
Federal Tax Reports, 55 TAxEs ON PARADE 54 (Nov. 1968).
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after for subsequent like periods unless at least (60) sixty days
prior to the end of any term either party shall give the other writ-
ten notice of desire to discontinue said service at the end of the
current term.'
One day before the termination date, a Friday, defendant attempted to
cancel the contract by written notice. The notice was received on the
next business day, a Monday, two days beyond the termination date.
Defendant had notified plaintiff of his desire to discontinue the service
by telephone one day before the sixty day period. There was no pro-
vision in the contract making time of the essence.
The lower court held,2 as a matter of law, that the notice of cancella-
tion was effective notwithstanding the seemingly clear and unambigu-
ous language requiring notice to be given sixty days before the con-
tract's end. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 3 in affirming the lower
court's decision, reasoned that:
Absent a showing that appellant [Music, Inc.] was damaged in
any way by receipt of the termination notice on October 3rd, or
that he changed his position to his detriment, it would be uncon-
scionable to hold appellee [Klein] to an additional contract of three
years and eight months.4
It is essential to underscore the difference between time of the essence
in the ordinary contract where the promisor has bound himself to
perform within a stated period, and in an option contract where notice
of intention to exercise the option is to be given within a stated time.
In the former instance it is said that a court of equity will not view
time as of the essence unless so stated in express terms, while at law
time is generally of the essence. 5 It is the latter area with which this
note is concerned.
Simply stated, the problem is whether or not a power to terminate
an existing contract must be exercised within the period expressly pro-
vided in the contract. An early Pennsylvania case seemed to recognize
the principle that where a certain time is designated within which to
1. 213 Pa. Super. at 184, 245 A.2d at 651.
2. See n.1, at 184 of 213 Pa. Super. 182 and at 651 of 245 A.2d 650, which cited the
unreported opinion of the County Court of Allegheny, filed February 7, 1968 at No. 595
of 1967.
3. Judge Spaulding wrote for the majority. Judge Montgomery concurred in the result.
Judge Hoffman, with whom Judge Watkins joined, wrote a dissenting opinion.
4. 213 Pa. Super. at 186, 245 A.2d at 652.
5. Bellas v. Hays, 5 S. & R. 427 (Pa. 1819). This position has been criticized as non-
descriptive by one writer. 5 A. ComsiN, CoRBIN ON CONTRAcrs § 713 (1952).
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exercise an option, it must be exercised within that period.6 In Central
Guarantee Co. v. Union National Bank,7 defendant was given an option
to cancel the contract "at the end of the first year" which fell on July 1,
1923. The court held defendant's attempt to cancel on July 11, 1923,
ten days after the termination date, ineffective, and reasoned: "We are
of the opinion that time was of the essence in the provision of the con-
tract as to the right of appellee to cancel, and that the question whether
the notice of cancellation was given within a reasonable time is not in-
volved in this case." This result was expressly overruled by the instant
caseY
Courts in other jurisdictions have treated language substantially the
same as that in Central Guarantee Co. v. Union National Bank as giving
the optionee a reasonable time after the expiraiion date to exercise the
option. 10
However, all courts seem to have consistently held that termination
must be within the specified period where the clause has read "prior
to, ' ' " "within,"' 2 or "on or before.' 3 Indeed some courts have based
their holdings on the difference in the language used in the termina-
tion clause.' 4 In support of these holdings, the two leading writers in
this area agree that time is nearly always of the essence in contracts
containing options to cancel.'
6. Markley v. Godfrey, 254 Pa. 99, 98 A. 785 (1916).
7. 92 Pa. Super. 70 (1927).
8. Id. at 75. For similar reasoning see: Farmers and Mechanics National Bank v.
Central Guaranty, 241 S.W. 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Lewis-Hale Coal Co. Inc. v. Enter-
prise Fuel Co., 33 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1929); Monmouth County Electric Co. v. Consoli-
dated Gas Co. of New Jersey, 83 N.J.L. 531, 83 A. 900 (1912); SantaClar a Properties Co.
v. R. L. C. Inc., 32 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1963).
9. See n.4, at 186 of 213 Pa. Super. 182 and at 652 of 245 A.2d 650, where the court
stated: "To the extent that Central Guarantee Co. v. Union Nat'l. Bank, 92 Pa. Superior
Ct. 70 (1927), derogates from this opinion in that it makes time of the essence as a
matter of law in such contracts, that opinion is overruled."
10. Central Guarantee Co. v. National Bank of Tacoma, 137 Wash. 24, 241 P. 285
(1925); Rogers v. Burr, 97 Ga. 10, 25 S.E. 339 (1895); Davis v. Godart, 131 Minn. 261, 154
N.W. 1091 (1915); McDougall v. O'Connell, 72 Wash. 349, 130 P. 362 (1913); Reitz v.
Brouhard, 198 Iowa 37, 199 N.W. 420 (1924).
11. Fred-Mosher Grain v. Kansas -Co-Op Wheat Market Ass'n, 136 Kan. 269, 15 P.2d
421 (1932).
12. Santa Clara Properties Co. v. R. L. C. Inc., 32 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1963).
13. First Securities Co. v. American Hecolite Denture Corp., 153 Ore. 499, 56 P.2d
339 (1936).
14. Central Guarantee Co. v. National Bank of Tacoma, 137 Wash. 24, 241 P. 285
(1925); First Securities Co. v. American Hecolite Denture Corp., 153 Ore. 499, 56 P.2d
339 (1936).
* 15. 6 A. COP.BIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1266, at 65 (1962). "The time and manner
of exercising a power of termination may be specified in the contract; in such cases an
attempt to exercise it otherwise will be ineffective." 6 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CON-
TRACTS § 853, at 222 (3d ed., 1962). "Time is likewise of the essence of options to termi-
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The court in Music relied on three cases16 for the proposition that
notice given within a reasonable time after the contract date is suffi-
cient absent a showing of prejudice to the other party. However as
Judge Hoffman's dissent pointed out, this reliance is misplaced.' 7 In
Central Guarantee Co. v. National Bank of Tacoma,'8 thei Washington
court reasoned that the power to terminate a five year contract "at the
end of the first year" could be exercised at any time during a reasonable
period after the expiration of the year so that the optionee would have
the entire year to decide whether or not to exercise the option. It
observed, however, that an opposite result would be reached if the
clause in question had been in the nature of an option which had to be
exercised at some point prior to the last moment of the last day (the
situation in Music) or if the language had been "within one'year."' 9
Similarly, neither Bennett's Inc. v. Krough20 nor Mayhew v. Van-
way2' supports the court's conclusion in Music. In both cases, the courts
were willing to assume, for the purposes of arguement, that reserved
options to cancel need not be exercised within the specified periods.
They then proceeded to hold as a matter of law that even under such
a construction of the termination clause, the delay in giving notice was
beyond a reasonable time. Clearly, neither decision is authority for a
conclusion that a clause compelling notification within a time certain
is satisfied upon the receipt of notice within a reasonable time there-
after.
The majority in Music viewed the issue as appearing "to be one of
first impression. ' 22 However, it is believed that the dicta in Markley v.
Godfrey23 and the compelling language in Central Guarantee Co. v.
Union National Bank24 provide sufficient precedential grounds upon
which Music could have been decided. In any event, it is at least note-
worthy that the court, while treating the issue as one of first impression,
felt compelled to take the precaution of reversing Central Guarantee
nate or cancel an existing contract, and the same principles apply." (Principles pertaining
to ordinary contracts of option).
16. Central Guarantee Co. v. National Bank of Tacoma, 137 Wash. 24, 241 P. 285
(1925); Mayhew v. Vanway, 371 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Bennett's Inc. v.
Krough, 115 Colo. 18, 168 P.2d 554 (1946).
17. 213 Pa. Super. at 188, 245 A.2d at 653.
18. 137 Wash. 24, 241 P. 285 (1925).
19. 241 P. at 287.
20. 115 Colo. 18, 168 P.2d 554 (1946).
21. 371 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
22. 213 Pa. Super. at 185, 245 A.2d at 652.
23. 254 Pa. 99, 98 A. 785 (1916). See text at note 6, supra.
24. 92 Pa. Super. 70 (1927). See text at note 8, supra., : .
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in so far as it "derogates from this opinion in that it makes time of the
essence as a matter of law in such contracts .... 25 What appears more
likely than a judicial belief that there was extant no sufficient precedent
to decide Music, is that the court was straining to reach what it be-
lieved to be an equitable result not sanctioned by existing law. Not-
withstanding the danger to the legal process that can occur if the courts
fail to give the true reasons for their decisions, it remains to be seen
whether the court has in fact reached a truly "desirable" result, and if
so, whether or not there are precedents or logical reasons to support
such a result.
As previously stated, a court of equity normally does not regard
time as being of the essence unless stated in express terms.26 However,
even equity regards time of the essence in option contracts. 27 The ratio-
nale for this position is that if the concept of option is regarded as an
offer, it must be accepted before its lapse; or if regarded as an express
condition, it must be accepted in order to bind the other party.28 The
cases and writers in discussing the issue of a reserved power to terminate
appear to have, without explanation, applied the general rules con-
cerning option contracts.2 9 It is believed that the continued failure to
distinguish between these dissimilar situations is erroneous.
Certainly in the ordinary option contract where A, in return for a
valuable consideration, is given a ten day option to purchase Black-
acre, it cannot be said that a severe penalty or forefeiture results in
denying A the right to purchase Blackacre on the eleventh day. A has
received full value for his consideration and has tendered nothing
additional which he must now forfeit.30 Both a court of equity and a
court of law are correct in treating time of the essence in such a situa-
tion and not extending A's option to purchase Blackacre-something
which the parties obviously did not intend.
Notwithstanding the authority noted above,8 1 it is believed that a
distinction can be drawn between the ordinary option contract and
the situation in the instant case where, if the terminating party is not
25. See n.4, at 186 of 213 Pa. Super. 182 and at 652 of 245 A.2d 650.
26. Bellas v. Hays, 5 S. & R. 427 (Pa. 1819).
27. Ray v. Thomas, 191 Tenn. 195, 232 S.W.2d 32 (1950).
28. For a discussion on the subject see Corbin, Option Contracts, 23 YALE L.J. 641
(1913).
29. See notes 8, 10 and 15, supra.
30. See Corbin, supra note 27, at 660 for a discussion on the character of an option
holder's interest.
31. See notes 8, 10 and 15, supra.
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permitted to revoke within a very reasonable time after the termina-
tion date, he is made a party to another three-year, eight-month con-
tract of which he wants no part. It has been suggested that time will
not be of the essence where a severe penalty or forefeiture results.8 2
Accordingly, it is strongly urged that to bind an unwilling party to a
contract of such length is, to a certain extent, a severe penalty which a
court of equity should avoid if possible. Judge Hoffman's dissent did
point out that the terminating party "would still be entitled in the
future to whatever benefits were conferred upon him by the con-
tract."'' 3 However, if the delay was not an unreasonable one and can-
not be shown to have resulted in any prejudice, a seemingly just
conclusion is reached without such conceptual difficulty as to make the
result untenable.
Indeed, with the facts before it, a court of equity might easily reach
this result: the self-continuing contract was an extremely lengthy one,
three-years, eight-months; the terminating party had given oral notice
one day before the sixty-day period, 4 seemingly not too great a delay;
and, most importantly, no prejudice was shown as a result of this de-
lay. While these facts may serve to distinguish the present holding from
subsequent cases, it is urged that a workable principle be evolved
permitting equity to reach a desired result without distorting any basic
contract principles.
This is not to suggest that the time period provided for in the
cancellation clause be ignored in every case. If the parties intended to
make time of the essence and this intention is clear from their language
or the surrounding circumstances, unquestionably, it should be
honored whether or not the exact provision to this effect is inserted. To
do otherwise would be to enforce a different contract than that which
the parties made. Of course if the other party is prejudiced by the
tardy notice, he should be entitled to his lost profits for the renewal
term.
The instant decision appears to go further than any modern case in
relieving the terminating party from the automatic renewal provision
of the contract. It seems clear that the precedent before the court
32. 5A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACrS § 1177, at 321 (1964).
33. 213 Pa. Super. at 188, 245 A.2d at 653.
34. However, Judge Hoffman's analysis and criticism of the majority's alternate
holding "that notice on the first business day of the contract period satisfies the contract
even under a strict construction" (See n.4 at 186 of 213 Pa. Super. 182 and at 652 of
245 A.2d 650) is quite convincing in that notice was received on the 58th day, a Monday,
and that notice could certainly have been received by mail on the 60th day, a Saturday.
315
Duquesne Law Review
commanded a contrary result. While equity may well justify the result
reached, the instant court has subjected its decision to critcism by
reliance on seemingly inappropriate precedent rather than facing the
problem before it. It is urged that with the reasoning set out above,
the present case might have served as an appropriate vehicle to make
a significant contribution in an area of the law which has developed on
a matter-of-fact basis.
Charles J. Romito
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF AN OCCUPIER-The California Su-
preme Court has stated that the proper test to be applied to the
liability of a possessor of land is whether in management of his prop-
erty he acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of in-
juries to others, and plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee
is not determinative.
Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968).
The Supreme Court of California had rejected the distinctions between
trespasser, licensee, and invitee as determinative elements in deciding
whether or not an occupier has been negligent in causing injuries to
a person upon his land. Although section 17141 of the California Civil
Code sets forth the standard of reasonable care under the circum-
stances, and there are no provisions in the code granting any excep-
tions to occupiers of land, California had heretofore made exceptions
to section 1714 and followed the common law classifications of plain-
tiff together with the corresponding gradations of duty owed by an
occupier.2 In Rowland, the court declared that these exceptions were
no longer justified, and that the proper test to be employed was
whether in management of his property defendant had acted as a rea-
sonable man in view of the probability of injuries to others. Section
1714 of the code so closely resembles the foundation of common law
negligence that a study of the facts of this case and the doctrines
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1954), provides:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the manage-
ment of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by
want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself ....
2. Hansen v. Richey, 237 Cal. App. 2d 475, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
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